Tax competition and factors influencing the gross domestic product and foreign direct investments of CEE countries by Dragos Paun
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Tax competition and factors influencing the gross
domestic product and foreign direct investments
of CEE countries
Dragos Paun
To cite this article: Dragos Paun (2019) Tax competition and factors influencing the gross
domestic product and foreign direct investments of CEE countries, Economic Research-Ekonomska
Istraživanja, 32:1, 876-893, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1585896
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1585896
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group.
Published online: 23 Apr 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 399
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Tax competition and factors influencing the gross
domestic product and foreign direct investments of
CEE countries
Dragos Paun
Faculty of Business, Universitatea Babes-Bolyai, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
ABSTRACT
In the beginning of the twenty-first century, governments have
tried to attract companies by offering different tax incentives or
even changing their entire tax regime. Among the countries that
have attracted foreign investments we have countries in Eastern
Europe which enjoyed the benefits of the Single European Market
and the stability that an EU membership brings. Given the
importance of foreign capital we focus our paper on the factors
the impact FDI and GDP. The main objective of the paper was to
assess the impact of taxation on the GDP and FDI but our analysis
has allowed to also view the impact of other factors such as infra-
structure, unemployment, cost of doing business and labour
force. We have selected 11 countries of the 13 New Member
States that have joined the EU after 2004 and looked at data for
the years 2005–2015. To see which factors influence the GDP and
FDI, we have used the method of panel least squares. The results
of our analysis show that taxation does play a role in the increase
of the GDP and the attraction of FDI. Nevertheless, it is not the
main factor and countries should not only rely on reduction of fis-
cal pressure.
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Starting in the twenty-first century, we have seen a high movement of capital between
countries. The movement of capital alone does not necessarily result in growth and
wealth for companies or citizens. For countries to benefit from the inflow of capital,
taxation plays a vital role. While looking at the European Union (EU), we notice that
the average tax to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rate is 40% (DIAS Raquel et al.
2016) , which could be considered high if we compare it to 26% in the United States.
However, the EU must not be viewed as a compact block in regard to taxation due
the low impact of the European Union on its member states. In addition to indirect
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taxes, where the VAT Directive leads as the best example of tax harmonisation in the
EU, the European Commission has failed to find a common understanding.
The objective of the paper is to assess the impact of taxation on GDP and Foreign
Direct Investments (FDI). However, after analysing the data and constructing the
model, we have focused also on other factors that impact foreign direct investment
and gross domestic product. Our assumption was that taxation is an important deter-
minant in FDI inflow and GDP growth. The importance of the paper is given by the
fact that a correlation between the factors would imply that countries should focus
on their tax system to attract foreign capital. This goes in line with several other
authors who consider low taxation to be a factor in the attraction of FDI (Azemar &
Delios, 2008), (Cassette & Paty, 2008), (Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008),
(Mariana 2008), (Nistor & Paun, 2013), (Redoano 2014), (Zodrow 2003), (Zodrow
2010). For many countries, taxation represents the primary source of government rev-
enue. Thus, an increase in revenue can only occur through an increase in tax pressure
or an increase in the tax base. In an effort to increase these revenues, we have seen
that countries have developed complex fiscal systems that enable them to attract for-
eign capital. The tax competition could be beneficial for the countries, but it can also
be harmful, leading to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ with countries reducing their statutory
corporate income tax rates.
2. Literature review
Looking at the literature available, we notice that some authors have focused on the
impact of taxation on foreign direct investment and tax competition. The fact that
the taxes play a significant role in the location of FDI is supported by Azemar and
Delios (2008). Their study shows that the fear of tax competition is not completely
unjustified, as FDI reacts to changes in tax rates. Guziejewska, Grabowski, and
Bryndziak (2014) define tax competition as all the attempts within a taxation policy
at lower tax burdens to increase the attractiveness of a given tax jurisdiction for
domestic or foreign investors. According to Wilson (1999), the purpose of tax compe-
tition is that each government would choose its tax policy in order to maximise the
welfare of the residence. This decision subsequently affects other governments by
reducing their tax base. According to Oates (1972), ‘The result of tax competition
may well be a tendency toward less than efficient levels of output of local services. In
an attempt to keep taxes low to attract business investment, local officials may hold
spending below those levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, particu-
larly for those programs that do not offer direct benefits to local business’. While the
literature also talks about the differences between vertical tax competition and hori-
zontal tax competition, in the case of Eastern European Countries, we can only talk
about the latter, as the countries that are the focus of this article are not federal coun-
tries. As mentioned before, the aim of this paper was to analyse if there was a clear
correlation between taxation and GDP and FDI. To test the correlation, we have
looked not only at the relationship between the tax rates and the abovementioned
variables but also at other factors that might determine these variables. These factors
include infrastructure, cost of labour, cost of doing business and demographic factors.
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Knowing which of the factors have a higher influence on FDI and GDP could help
governments to design a tax system that would maximise development. Our work is
bringing novelty to the research in this area because previous authors have either
focused on the importance and impact of foreign direct investments or just looked at
the impact of corporate income tax among member states.
Zodrow (2003), Redoano (2014), Fernandez-de-Cordoba and Torres (2012), Dzialo
(2015) and Bertola (2016) have all focused their research on European tax competi-
tion or tax harmonisation, but their conclusions do not give a clear answer whether
the European Union is better off with countries competing among themselves or
working together. Zodrow (2003) concludes that tax competition leads to an ineffi-
cient under-provision of public services. Redoano (2014) analysed panel data from
European countries between 1970 and 1999 and shows that a membership in the EU
forces countries to react to a drop in SCIT in another member state.
Yakita (2014), in his study related to the short- and long-term effects of tax com-
petition, concludes that tax cuts may increase the capital-labour ratio in the home
country because of a decrease in capital outflows, but in the long term under certain
conditions, it can also reduce capital-labour ratios.
In general, in the literature, the positive effects of FDI on the growth of the econ-
omy are linked to several factors. In their paper, Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee
(1998) argue that technological spill-over from foreign companies can only appear
when there is a certain level of human capital in the host country. There are other
authors who also support this idea, but there is also a very interesting perspective
from Hermes and Lensink (2003), who show that the development of the financial
system of the recipient country is an important precondition for FDI to have a posi-
tive impact on economic growth. A better-developed financial system positively con-
tributes to the process of technological diffusion associated with FDI. We have also
considered the opinion of Bonciu (2003) to be very important for our study because
he believes that new investments (Greenfield) provide a significant influence on eco-
nomic growth by engendering new production capacities, new working places, and
creating new consumers for the products and thus new taxpayers of indirect taxes.
He considers that the participation of a foreign company in the privatisation process
also impacts the economy, but most of the time, the number of jobs decreases after a
foreign takeover. Sarkar (2007) analysed panel (1981–2002) and time-series
(1970–2002) data for 51 less developed countries to see if foreign direct investment
promotes growth and shows that from this group, there are long-term relations
between FDI and the growth of per-capita income only in a few countries, whereas
for four countries, there is a clear negative relation.
Before going to the model, we have looked at statutory corporate income tax rates
of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe to see if we can see signs of tax com-
petition (Table 1).
Looking at the developments in statutory corporate income tax (SCIT) rates for
the countries in Eastern Europe, we notice that the majority of them have reduced
the SCIT rate just before or soon after joining the European Union. Most of these
countries have done so to create a more competitive tax system either to attract for-
eign investments or to support local companies. Following the entry of these low-
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SCIT countries, some of the older member states also had to adjust their rates in
order to keep companies from seeking lower rates and higher profits outside their
jurisdictions (see Austria, Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands). The argument that
countries will react to the decisions of others is supported, as mentioned before, by
(Wilson 1999). The study by Cassette and Paty (2008) shows that there is a strong
influence on the tax regime of another country, but most of the time, the strongest
factor is geographic proximity, which would explain why Austria and Germany were
among the first countries to reduce their rates following the accession of
CEE countries.
The most notable evolutions of the period are those of Bulgaria and Hungary. We
notice that Bulgaria has the highest drop in its SCIT tax rate (13,5 percentage points),
while Hungary is the only one that has increased its SCIT rate in the period men-
tioned. If the business environment had not reacted positively and increased its tax
base, Bulgaria would have had serious problems as there was a more than 50% drop
in a timeframe of five years. Bulgaria’s case supports the argument that reducing the
rates could create an environment that would attract investors and in the end lead to
a higher revenue. A detailed picture can be observed in Figures 1 and 2, which show
the evolution of the SCIT and revenue from CIT in both Bulgaria and Hungary. In
the short term, the revenue from CIT dropped from three percent to 1.8 percent of
GDP but then reached 4.4 percent in 2007, the year Bulgaria joined the EU. The sub-
sequent reduction is due to the economic and financial crisis and the debt crisis that
have hit the EU. In the case of Hungary, we see an initial decrease of SCIT and then,
Table 1. Statutory corporate income tax rates in CEE Countries 2002–2014.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Bulgaria 23.5 23.5 19.5 15.0 15.0 10.0 10.0
Czech Republic 31.0 31.0 28.0 26.0 24.0 24.0 21.0
Estonia 26.0 26.0 26.0 24.0 23.0 22.0 21.0
Ireland 16.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Cyprus 28.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Latvia 22.0 19.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Lithuania 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 19.0 18.0 15.0
Hungary 19.6 19.6 17.6 17.5 17.5 21.3 21.3
Malta 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
Poland 28.0 27.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Romania 25.0 25.0 25.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
Slovenia 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 23.0 22.0
Slovakia 250 25.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Bulgaria 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
Czech Republic 20.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Estonia 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 20.0
Ireland 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5
Cyprus 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 12.5 12.5 12.5
Latvia 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Lithuania 20.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
Hungary 21.3 20.6 20.6 20.6 20.6 20.6 20.6
Malta 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0 35.0
Poland 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0
Romania 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0
Slovenia 21.0 20.0 20.0 18.0 17.0 17.0 17.0
Slovakia 19.0 19.0 19.0 19.0 23.0 22.0 22.0
Source: Author’s own calculations based in data from Eurostat.
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after a few years, an increase due to a need for short-term revenue in the budget.
When lowering the SCIT, positive changes to the collected revenue as a percentage of
GDP appear only after a certain time. When a country raises the SCIT, it will experi-
ence a short-term boost of the revenue followed by a medium-term reduction
(Figures 1 and 2).
In previous work, we have discussed the relationship between SCIT and FDI
(Nistor & Paun, 2013), but the focus has been mostly on Romania. The model that
Figure 2. Evolution of the SCIT rates and percentage of CIT in the GDP in Hungary (2002–2015).
Source: Author’s own calculations.
Figure 1. Evolution of the SCIT rates and percentage of CIT in the GDP in Bulgaria (2002–2015).
Source: Author’s own calculations.
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was used only considers the CIT and VAT rates, while as mentioned before in the
paper, FDI does not only react to taxation but to several variables.
In our analysis, we have also considered that the GDP will depend on the labour
cost and unemployment, with many companies switching their base of operations in
Eastern Europe due to lower labour costs. Additionally, we have taken into consider-
ation that infrastructure and its development play a role. While these variables are
linked most of the time with labour-intensive jobs, we have also included variables
that could attract other types of capital: investment in education, bank deposits to
GDP, and costs to start a business (percentage of income per capita).
3. Data
Our study was focused on countries in Eastern Europe, as the literature has relatively
little information about these countries in regard to tax competition and capital mobil-
ity. Additionally, most of the countries have a similar profile, former communist coun-
tries that started their development at the beginning of the 1990s. In the first years of
democracy, these countries all went through major reforms; thus, it is difficult to ana-
lyse and to find proper data for these years. We have looked at several sources to find
accurate data and to refine the numbers when we have found different numbers from
different databases. The data that we have used for the countries was collected from the
same source for each variable to compare the same type of data. Most of the data were
collected from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development database, the
Eurostat database, the European Central Bank database, the World Bank database and
the database of the DG Taxation and Customs Union of the European Commission.
The data that we have obtained was most of the time either in USD or in Euros, so
there was no need for conversion. To confirm that the information is accurate, where it
was possible, we have also checked primary sources, i.e., national institutes of statistics.
Our most important variables were the gross domestic product, the inflow of foreign
direct investments and the tax rates (Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate, taxes on
capital as percentage of total taxes, and taxes on capital as percentage of GDP). For the
GDP, we have the amounts in USD at current prices. This was because the countries
that we have selected use different national currencies. Some of them switched to the
Euro in the studied period and have thus benefited from the stability of the European
currency. We did not choose real prices, as the effects of inflation were not very
important for our study, and most of these effects are also balanced by the exchange
rate and thus resolved through conversion from national currency to USD. When
speaking about capital mobility, we have many definitions and concepts. Most likely,
the easiest to understand is the ability of capital to cross national borders without
obstacles and in search of higher returns. In our model, we have assumed that the
mobility of capital is represented by the inflow of foreign direct investment. We did
not consider the outflow of FDI because the countries that we have selected are not
known as capital exporters. This is not because of obstacles but has more to do with
the capacity of local companies that do not cross national borders, with exemptions of
course. The percentage of tax on capital was chosen as a sign of the tax pressure on
capital mobility. These were chosen because they focus not only on foreign capital but
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on the entire economy. While FDI inflow does not react fast in the case of changes in
tax policy, companies already operating in the jurisdiction are forced to react.
Some of the variables rely on expenditures of the government–infrastructure–such
as length of highways and length of railways. Infrastructure was chosen as a variable
because of the importance of access to international markets. As the markets in CEE
countries are relatively small (except Poland and perhaps Romania), most companies
would not rely solely on the domestic market but are using the countries as produc-
tion and/or distribution centres. We have included demographic variables such as
wages, unemployment and population, as these are important determinants of FDI.
Access to a cheap labour force has been a driver of globalisation since the beginning
(of course, we see now that in most of the CEE countries, this is not the case, and
companies are looking more for competences than reduction of costs). The availabil-
ity of the labour force is also strongly linked to the arguments that human resources
are an important driver of FDI. We also looked at variables that are influenced dir-
ectly by the state–cost of doing business and statutory corporate income tax. Finally,
in our analysis, we have also included some of the variables that are indirectly linked
to the measures taken by the government–EMU convergence bond yields, taxes on
capital as percentage of total taxes, and taxes on capital as a percentage of GDP.
4. Methodology
As a wok method, we chose the Fully Modified Least Squares Method for the estima-
tion of the correlation between the GDP and the variables. This method is used to
provide the optimal estimates of cointegrating regressions. Using the same method,
we have explained the correlation of FDI using the variables that were chosen. When
looking at the revenue collection rate in the EU, we notice that the average in the last
13 years is between 38.8 and 39.4 percent. As there is a continuous competition in
lowering taxes, the only way a country can increase its revenue is through increasing
its GDP, thus making it vital to see the correlation between taxation, growth (repre-
sented by GDP) and capital mobility (FDI inflow). Before doing the test for causality,
we have first performed a test for stationarity or a test of the order of integration for
each variable that we have chosen.
The check of the stationarity of times-series variables is most of the time done by
using the traditional Augmented Dickey Fuller (Dickey & Fuller, 1981) and the
Philips and Perron unit root test (Phillips & Perron, 1988). Similar to Agrawal
(2015), we have also used for our panel data the Levin–Lin–Chu test (Levin, Lin, &
Chu, 2002) and the lm–Persaran–Shin test (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003). In the table
below, we will show the results of the test for the variables that we have included in
our hypothesis and the sources of our data (Table 2).
After the stationarity test was performed we passed to the next step, which is to
test for the existence of a long-run cointegration among our variables using panel
cointegration tests suggested by Pedroni. We made use of seven panel cointegrations
by Pedroni (1999), since he determines the appropriateness of the tests to be applied
to estimated residuals from a cointegration regression after normalising the panel sta-
tistics with correction terms.
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Table 2. Results of the panel unit root test.
Method Statistic Prob. Cross sections Obs
Series: Gross Domestic Product (current prices)*
Annotation: “GDP”
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 13.6341 0.0000 11 121
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 10.5256 0.0000 11 121
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 125.981 0.0000 11 121
PP - Fisher Chi-square 217.369 0.0000 11 132
Series: Foreign Direct Investments, inflow*
Annotation: “FDI”
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 4.92887 0.0000 11 132
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.40002 0.0000 11 132
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 60.4775 0.0000 11 132
PP - Fisher Chi-square 143.334 0.0000 11 143
Series: Statutory Corporate Income Tax*****
Annotation: “SCIT”
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 8.64519 0.0000 9 99
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 8.04512 0.0000 9 99
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 87.2064 0.0000 9 99
PP - Fisher Chi-square 158.699 0.0000 9 108
Series: EMU convergence bond yields****
Annotation: “EMU_BY”
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 3.93612 0.0000 11 121
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 5.75066 0.0000 11 121
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 73.9285 0.0000 11 121
PP - Fisher Chi-square 166.053 0.0000 11 132
Series: Average hourly labor costs**
Annotation: “Hourly Cost”
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 7.83644 0.0000 11 132
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.37187 0.0000 11 132
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 57.8132 0.0000 11 132
PP - Fisher Chi-square 128.242 0.0000 11 143
Series: Total unemployment rate*
Annotation: “Unemployment”
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 5.84544 0.0000 11 121
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.86392 0.0000 11 121
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 63.4744 0.0000 11 121
PP - Fisher Chi-square 130.317 0.0000 11 132
Series: Total length of motorways**
Annotation: “Motorway“
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 5.81715 0.0000 10 110
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 7.12884 0.0000 10 110
(continued)
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Table 2. Continued.
Method Statistic Prob. Cross sections Obs
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 83.9042 0.0000 10 110
PP - Fisher Chi-square 220.711 0.0000 10 120
Series: Employment*
Annotation: “Employment“
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 7.73000 0.0000 11 121
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 5.05527 0.0000 11 121
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 65.7983 0.0000 11 121
PP - Fisher Chi-square 101.823 0.0000 11 132
Series: Taxes on capital as percentage of GDP**
Annotation: “Tax on Capital as GDP “
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 8.13285 0.0000 11 132
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.69059 0.0000 11 132
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 62.3678 0.0000 11 132
PP - Fisher Chi-square 77.9944 0.0000 11 143
Series: Taxes on capital as percentage of total taxes**
Annotation: “Tax on Capital as TT”
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 8.29405 0.0000 11 132
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.88926 0.0000 11 132
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 64.5687 0.0000 11 132
PP - Fisher Chi-square 79.8616 0.0000 11 143
Series: Population*
Annotation: “Population”
Order of integration: I (1)
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 7.73000 0.0000 11 121
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 5.05527 0.0000 11 121
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 65.7983 0.0000 11 121
PP - Fisher Chi-square 101.823 0.0000 11 132
Series: Total length of railway lines**
Annotation: “Railway“
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 5.18215 0.0000 10 120
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 3.49997 0.0002 10 120
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 45.7843 0.0009 10 120
PP - Fisher Chi-square 70.6385 0.0000 10 130
Series: Cost to start a business (percentage of income per capita)***
Annotation: “Cost_Business“
Order of integration: 0
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t 7.10472 0.0000 11 132
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 4.90801 0.0000 11 132
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 64.1724 0.0000 11 132
PP - Fisher Chi-square 115.143 0.0000 11 143 Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Source: Author’s own calculation based on data from:  UNCTAD Stats;  Eurostat;  World Bank;  European
Central Bank; DG Taxation and Customs Union.
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The procedures proposed by Pedroni make use of estimated residual from the
hypothesised long-run regression of the following form:
yi;t ¼ ai þ dit þ b1ix1i;t þ b2ix2i;t þ :::þ bMixMi;t þ ei;t
for t¼ 1,… .,T; i¼ 1,… ., N; m¼ 1, … ., M,
where T is the number of observations over time, N the number of cross-sectional
units in the panel, and M the number of regressors. In this set up, ai is the member
specific intercept or fixed effects parameter which varies across individual cross-
Table 3 Pedroni residual cointegration.
Included observations: 154
Cross-sections included: 10 (1 dropped)
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend
User-specified lag length: 1
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension)
Weighted
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob.
Panel v-Statistic 2.619679 0.9956 2.572020 0.9949
Panel rho-Statistic 3.468137 0.9997 3.712240 0.9999
Panel PP-Statistic 5.741972 0.0000 4.722016 0.0000
Panel ADF-Statistic 1.621354 0.9475 1.901000 0.9713
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension)
Statistic Prob.
Group rho-Statistic 5.067847 1.0000
Group PP-Statistic 4.319431 0.0000
Group ADF-Statistic 3.019551 0.9987
Cross section specific results
Phillips–Peron results (non-parametric)
Cross ID AR(1) Variance HAC Bandwidth Obs
Bulgaria 8E-04 0.005830 0.004922 3.00 12
Czech 0.336 0.001130 0.001125 2.00 12
Cyprus 0.319 0.000658 0.000658 0.00 12
Estonia 0.322 0.004908 0.005096 1.00 12
Latvia Dropped from Test
Lithuania 0.336 0.006917 0.006384 2.00 12
Hungary 0.534 0.002606 0.002453 1.00 12
Poland 0.052 0.006697 0.005945 2.00 12
Romania 0.512 0.007140 0.005643 3.00 12
Slovenia 0.191 0.009789 0.010316 1.00 12
Slovakia 0.477 0.004539 0.001984 6.00 12
Augmented Dickey–Fuller results (parametric)
Cross ID AR(1) Variance Lag Max lag Obs
Bulgaria 0.360 0.005670 1 – 11
Czech 0.153 0.001077 1 – 11
Cyprus 0.145 0.000665 1 – 11
Estonia 0.378 0.005143 1 – 11
Latvia Dropped from Test
Lithuania 0.622 0.005371 1 – 11
Hungary 0.746 0.002761 1 – 11
Poland 0.149 0.006923 1 – 11
Romania 0.795 0.007426 1 – 11
Slovenia 0.493 0.008350 1 – 11
Slovakia 1.115 0.004033 1 – 11
Source: Author’s own estimations.
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sectional units. The same is true of the slope coefficients and member specific time
effects, dit:
The results of the Pedroni Residual Cointegration test using deterministic and
trend assumptions are shown in Table 3.
5. Results and discussion
After setting the correct variables, we used the method of panel least squares to see
what the variables are that would influence FDI and GDP. We have noticed that
besides taxation, there are other factors influencing the GDP and FDI. Thus, we have
constructed several models using the different variables. In the end, we present the
models that we consider to be the most accurate given the profile of the countries
that we have selected in our pool (Table 4).
Our model has estimated the following equation based on the factors that we have
included in the analysis:
GDP ¼ 0.024065FDI  0.081146Cost of Business  0.427869Hourly Cost 
0.036084Motorways  0.481974Railways þ 3.044326Employment þ 1.490285Taxes
on Capital as % of GDP  1.937715Taxes on Capital as %of Total Taxes 
0.103452SCIT
The model explains 53% of the variation of the Gross Domestic Product for the
selected countries and the time and validates our hypothesis that it is influenced by
taxation. When testing our hypothesis we excluded some of the variables from the
model because these are closely linked with others – the population and the total
unemployment can be considered redundant if we take employment as a variable. We
have left the Railways and the Motorways in the model, even if the probability is
higher than 0.05 because the response of the overall model. Thus, after including the
Table 4. GDP model.
Dependent variable Gross Domestic Product
Method Panel Fully Modified Least Squares
Sample (adjusted) 2004 – 2015
Periods included 12
Cross-sections included 9
Total panel (balanced) observations 108
Panel Method Pooled estimation
Cointegration equitation deterministic C@Trend @Trend2
Long-run covariance estimates (Bartlett, kernel, Newey-West automatic bandwidth, NW-automatic lag length)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FDI 0.024065 0.013891 1.732420 0.0879
Cost_Business 0.081146 0.029742 2.728303 0.0081
Hourly Cost 0.427869 0.061340 6.975407 0.0000
Motorways 0.036084 0.055336 0.652096 0.5166
Railways 0.481974 0.319048 1.510663 0.1356
Employment 3.044326 0.356421 8.541382 0.0000
Tax on Capital as GDP 1.490285 0.329983 4.516251 0.0000
Tax on Capital as TT 1.937715 0.397162 4.878904 0.0000
SCIT 0.103452 0.059375 1.742342 0.0861
R-squared 0.529964
Adjusted R-squared 0.237971 Mean dependent var 0.032640
S.E. of regression 0.130424 S.D. dependent var 0.49407
Long run variance 0.004314
Source: Author’s own estimations.
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two mentioned variables the R-squared remains at a very high level 0.53 and the
model has no fixed effects.
There are seven variables that have a negative correlation with the GDP, the statu-
tory corporate tax rates, the average hourly labour costs and the percentage of the
taxes on capital from the total taxes, the cost of doing business and surprisingly the
length of motorways and railways. In our model, we see that there is a high correl-
ation between employment and the GDP and taxation. The infrastructure is surpris-
ingly negatively correlated. As a reason for this we can include the fact that most of
the infrastructure is provided by foreign companies. As another reason, we could
include the fact that the data is not sufficient to see the high impact of an increase in
infrastructure. In fact, in the years studied we did not see a major increase in infra-
structure. These findings are in contrast with those of Ahmad, Ismail, and Nordin
(2015), Bakar, Mat, and Harun (2012), Kaur, Khatua, and Yadav (2016), Rehman,
Ilyas, Mobeen Alam, and Akram (2011) and Wekesa, Wawire, and Kosimbei (2016).
In all their work infrastructure had a positive correlation with FDI.
In our model the most important variable is represented by employment which has
a correlation coefficient of 3.044326. This result is in the same order as other research-
ers who have studied specifically the effect of labour on FDI (Jude & Silaghi, 2016),
(Huiqun & Jinyong, 2011) and (Hunya & Geishecker, 2005). On the one hand this is
normal due to the fact that the economy can only grow if there is a large enough
workforce to produce the goods or to provide services, and on the other hand if we
consider economies that are growing because of consumption there is a need for people
who would consume the products – see the case of the German economy in 2015
(Figures 3 and 4).
There are some errors in the model, which are grouped for the countries that we
have included in our analysis, and most of them are around the two major crises and
their aftermaths that occurred within the studied period–the Economic and Financial
Crisis and the Sovereign Debt Crisis.
Using the model that we have created we can estimate the impact of the most
important variables which could be easily improved by governments. Thus, for
Figure 3. Coefficient confidence intervals GDP model. Source: Author’s own estimations.
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instance, if we look at employment we can see that these countries have struggled to
keep their workforce in the country after the accession to the EU. Romania and
Poland are countries with big minorities living outside their borders. Companies have
tried to promote measures that would convince their citizens to return to their home
countries. We also see that taxation plays an important role. The Statutory Corporate
Income Tax Rate has a low correlation 0.10 but we notice that taxes on capital as a
percentage of total taxes has a high negative correlation 1.93. Thus, we could say
that the more governments switch to taxes on capital, the less encouraging it is for
companies. The taxes on capital as percentage of GDP have a positive correlation of
1.49 because this is linked to any increase of the GDP.
If we examine taxation at the EU level, we notice that the average percentage of
taxes on capital from the total taxation is at approximately 20%. Estonia, for
instance, is at 7.1 percent (ranked twenty-fourth from EU MS), and it is at the EU
average level for labour taxation (ranked fifteenth from the EU MS in 2014),
above the EU level with taxes on consumption (ranked eighth). If Estonia would
switch from taxes on consumption to taxation of capital and reach average EU
levels, this would increase their GDP by 1 percent. The ranking is based on tax
revenue raised by Member States as a percentage of GDP and is based on a report
issued by the DG Taxation and Customs Union (Taxation Trends in the European
Union 2016).
The next step in our analysis was to see if the taxation of companies plays any
role in the inflow of foreign direct investment and what other variables have a signifi-
cant influence. Do the same variables influence both the gross domestic product and
the FDI? Is their impact positive or negative?
As in the previous example, we have tested several models before choosing one
that would have the highest percentage of the response variable variation.
Figure 4. Fitted model for dependent variable GDP. Source: Author’s own estimations.
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Our model has estimated the following equation based on the factors that we have
included in the analysis:
FDI¼ 0.21390732492FDI(1) þ 0.839884242059GDP þ 1.3494750168GDP(2) þ
0.391291059272EMU_BY(1)  0.722025267148 Hourly Cost (1) 
0.201594664444 Unemployment (1) þ 4.71581414583 Railway –
0.435004076522 SCIT
As in the previous model, the FDI is influenced by the infrastructure of the
country, but in this case, the only variable is the length of the railways. This is eas-
ily explained because most of the shipping should be done by train due to cost effi-
ciency and speed, if we are considering long distances (Patterson, Ewing, & Haider,
2008). Similar to the GDP model, we see that some of the variables have been taken
out, perhaps due to redundancy–employment and population. Unlike the GDP, the
FDI is influenced by the unemployment rate. Again, this is easy to explain, as
green-field investments rely on availability of a workforce. The model is also influ-
enced by the average hourly labour cost. Due to this, companies have put their
labour-intensive production facilities in Eastern European countries, while the pro-
duction facilities that require high production costs have still remained outside
these countries. In our model, this variable has a correlation coefficient of 0.722,
which is in line with most of the authors who argue that the decision to invest in
the Eastern European countries is driven by cost reduction (Popescu 2014) (Bellak,
Leibrecht, & Riedl, 2008).
Unlike in the GDP model, we notice that the 10-year bond yield does influence
our model. There is a discussion related to the purchase of state bonds because most
of the time, the mere purchase is not considered as FDI but portfolio foreign invest-
ment. The data from UNCTAD is based on the classic definition of FDI (IMF 1993),
which would count if there is a lasting power of the investor in a company by own-
ing at least 10% of the voting power. Nevertheless, there could be an influence of the
10-year bond yield because sometimes state bonds could be purchased through
domestically owned companies.
Table 5. FDI model.
Dependent variable FDI
Method Panel Fully Modified Least Squares
Sample (adjusted) 2006 – 2015
Periods included 10
Cross-sections included 10
Total panel (balanced) observations 100
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
FDI (1) 0.213907 0.078578 2.722219 0.0079
GDP 0.839884 0.401214 2.093358 0.0394
GDP (2) 1.349475 0.408551 3.303080 0.0014
EMU_BY (1) 0.391291 0.106638 3.669335 0.0004
Hourly Cost (1) 0.722025 0.348220 2.073476 0.0413
Unemployment (1) 0.201595 0.136632 1.475456 0.1440
Railway 4.715814 1.671245 2.821738 0.0060
SCIT 0.435004 0.446785 0.973631 0.0331
R-squared 0.323395
Adjusted R-squared 0.173039 Mean dependent var. 0.001136
S.E. of regression 0.630527 S.D. dependent var. 0.693364
Long run variance 0.227171
Source: Author’s own estimations.
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We again see that statutory corporate income tax has a high probability, but the
inclusion of this variable has increased the R-squared. Thus, if we take the entire
model, we see that there is significance to this model (Figure 5).
We also note that there is a problem with the residuals. The model that we esti-
mated does not follow a normal pattern, but this could be explained because there
could be many other variables that impact FDI inflows into a country (Figure 6).
6. Conclusions
In our study, we have started from the assumption that taxation does play a very
important role for countries. Due to this, countries will try to create a taxation system
Figure 5. Coefficient confidence intervals FDI model. Source: Author’s own estimations.
Figure 6. Fitted model for dependent variable FDI. Source: Author’s own estimations.
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that will allow them to attract new investments and generate growth. We have also
seen that switching from one type of taxation (from consumption to capital) could
increase the GDP.
The models that we have constructed both include statutory corporate income tax.
In the GDP model, we have seen that the variables related to taxation have a high
impact. The study clearly shows that there is a correlation between taxation, GDP
and FDI. Hence, there is a need to correlate the taxation systems in order to attract
FDI and generate a higher GDP and revenues for the states. In our model, we have a
negative correlation between the taxes on capital as percentage of the total taxes and
the GDP, which would imply that in order to grow their GDP, countries would need
to reduce the tax level. We also see that there is a negative correlation between the
statutory corporate income tax and both the GDP and the FDI. Governments should
not overestimate the effects of the reduction in statutory CIT because this could lead
to a “race to the bottom”. Designing an efficient taxation system, which would maxi-
mise the revenue and minimise the costs for corporations, is a difficult challenge, and
further studies are necessary to create a model that would allow countries to reach
the optimal point of Laffer’s curve. In our study, we did not take into account the
different types of treaties that could encourage or discourage investments. Having
investors from countries that apply the credit method would make the argument of a
lower tax rate obsolete, as the company investing would still need to pay taxes based
on their worldwide income. Moreover, other factors such as geographical proximity
were not considered, as there is no sufficient data to create models for each country
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